2 conflated with a related problem with which it is nevertheless importantly distinct: the problem of evil. As I aim to bring out, however, it is conceptually possible that whereas God is morally perfect (and so the problem of evil is solved), nevertheless God lacks standing; and it is furthermore conceptually possible that whereas the person at issue is not morally perfect (and so is not "God"), this person nevertheless has standing. Given these distinctions, we must be clear: are we challenging (or defending) God's perfection -or instead God's standing?
The second goal of this paper is to address the question it means to raise: does God have the moral standing to blame? My answer is as follows: So long as God gives us free will, then God will have the standing to blame. (Whether, given certain other salient facts, God could be perfect is, however, another matter -and one I won't address.) In particular, I
consider two "models of providence" at opposite ends of the theological spectrum -open theism, and theological determinism -and assess whether, on those models, God has the standing to blame God's creatures when those creatures do wrong. (I will assume that, if God has standing even on theological determinism, God will also have standing on [the there is no clear reason why God should lack the standing to blame. The case of theological determinism, however, is substantially more difficult. In the bulk of the paper, then, I argue that, given compatibilism, the God of theological determinism indeed will have the standing to blame. Accordingly, if you want to maintain that God could not possibly appropriately blame those God determines, then you will have to abandon compatibilism. The project of this paper, as I hope will become clear, thus has substantial implications for the traditional debate about the conditions of moral responsibility.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, I take up the question: what are the conditions on having the "standing to blame"? The contemporary discussion of "moral standing" was arguably inaugurated by G.A. Cohen's important paper, "Casting the First Stone: who can, and who can't, condemn the terrorists?", and this is where I begin my discussion. Cohen proposes two conditions on having "moral standing": a non-hypocrisy condition, and -more importantly, for our purposes -a non-involvement condition. With these conditions on the table, we will then be in position to ask how they apply (or fail to apply) to God.
ii We will also be in position to make a sharp distinction between the question 3 of God's standing and the question of God's perfection (and some related questions besides). I go on to contend that, on reflection, Cohen's two conditions in fact reduce to a single condition of moral commitment. The question whether God has standing, then, becomes the question whether, despite God's providential activities, God can plausibly still be morally committed to the values that would condemn what we do. I then turn to assess the pictures of God associated with open theism and theological determinism, and consider whether
God has the moral standing to blame, so construed, on those pictures.
Cohen on Hypocrisy and Involvement
Cohen's paper is one of the first to explicitly focus on the issues here at stake, and is worth quoting at length. He introduces the relevant topic as follows:
We can distinguish three ways in which a person may seek to silence, or to blunt the edge of, a critic's condemnation. First, she may seek to show that she did not, in fact, perform the action under criticism. Second, and without denying that she performed that action, she may claim that the action does not warrant moral condemnation, because there was an adequate justification for it, or at least a legitimate excuse for performing it. Third, while not denying that the action was performed, and that it is to be condemned (which is not to say: while agreeing that it is to be condemned), she can seek to discredit her critic's assertion of her standing as a good faith condemner of the relevant action. (2006: 119) It is this third way of responding to a critic's blame that Cohen is interested in, and here he identifies two different versions of such a response:
The first of these techniques for compromising a critic's voice was signalled in my childhood by the retort 'Look who's talking!' Shapiro might say, 'Hey, Goldstein, how come you didn't come to the club last night? All the guys were expecting you.'
And Goldstein might reply: 'Look who's talking. So much for Cohen's two conditions. Now we can begin to ask: how might these conditions apply to God? As a first approximation: the charge of involvement certainly seems more promising -and more relevant -than the charge of hypocrisy. If God blames me for stealing a bicycle, it seems doubtful that I could reply that God himself has stolen bicycles, so had better keep quiet. The charge of involvement, however, seems more pressing. For on any conception of God, there will be a sense in which God gave me the "means" to steal the bicycle, and on any conception of God, God was in position to prevent my stealing the bicycle, and yet did not -and so is, to that extent, responsible for the fact that I did end up stealing it. And on some conceptions of God (to be discussed shortly), God is himself responsible for my stealing the bicycle, precisely on grounds that -in some sense -God himself caused me to do so (along with everything else). And so whereas it is doubtful that I could object to God's blame on grounds that God has done something similar himself, it does seem that I may be able to object on grounds that God is himself responsible for the very thing he is condemning. This is the problem of the divine moral standing to blame.
I will return to the conditions on "moral standing" as proposed by Cohen shortly.
At this stage, however, it is crucial to see how the problem of divine standing is distinct from -albeit related to -the more familiar problem of evil. We can bring out the distinction as follows. Suppose that there is, in fact, an omnipotent, omniscient creator of the universe.
The problem of evil, in short, is this: in view of the facts of evil, how could any such creator nevertheless be morally perfect? If we hold fixed omnipotence and omniscience, then we'll have to forego moral perfection. (And if it is essential to being "God" that one is morally perfect, we'll have to say that any such creator is not, in fact, God.) But the problem of 6 divine standing is distinct from this problem. The problem of standing is this: in view of how such a creator would be (or, on some given conception, is) involved in our actions, how could that creator nevertheless have the standing to blame us? And here we must make two points. First, some will contend that even if the problem of evil is solved, so that the given creator is, in fact, morally perfect, nevertheless that creator could lack the standing to blame.
And, second, even if such a creator has the standing to blame, it doesn't follow that this creator in fact must be perfect. The two problems are, in this way, distinct.
Consider the former claim first. And recall Cohen's articulation of the "general form" of the "you're involved in it yourself" response to the critic:
You are implicated in the commission of this very act, as its co-responsible stimulus, indicating that the involvement took away (or at least diminished) the target's freedom, and therefore also his moral responsibility, or second, by indicating something about the wouldbe blamer's commitment to the relevant values. In neither case, however, is mere involvement doing the work to undermine one's standing to blame someone who is in fact morally responsible. More particularly, if one's "involvement" implies one's lack of standing, this is because, at a minimum, it implies a fault.
To explain. Consider, first, "You forced me to do it." It is, in a sense, easy to see how "You forced me to do it" might disable criticism: insofar as one was forced to do what one does, one isn't responsible. Similar remarks apply to "You made me do it", "You coerced me into doing it," and "You left me with no reasonable alternative." If your 8 involvement in my coming to do something left me with no reasonable alternative to doing it, then your involvement seemingly took away my freedom with respect to doing it; instead, I was forced, and so not responsible. However, insofar as one's response to a critic serves to indicate that one is not even responsible, we do not here have an instance of the kind of response at issue -one that explicitly does not deny one's responsibility. In short, the "reply"
to God we are considering in this paper is not "You made me to do it, so I'm not responsible," but instead, "Even if I'm responsible, you can't blame me."
However, if the response does not work by indicating one's non-responsibility, I
claim, then it works only by indicating something further about the blamer -beyond the blamer's mere responsibility for what one does. To see this point, we must consider Cohen's other examples:
-You helped me to do it.
-You asked me to do it.
-You gave me the means to do it.
-You commanded me to do it.
Crucially, I contend that, in all of these cases, there are ways in which one might have done the thing in question, and thereby be responsible (even morally responsible) for what the given person does, and yet one's standing to blame her remains intact. Such cases all display a similar structure -a structure we can bring out by considering Cohen's case of the Nazi commander. Now, Cohen certainly seems right that the typical Nazi commander lacks the standing to blame his soldiers for faithfully following his orders, even if such orders should be disobeyed. Importantly, however, what accounts for this fact is not merely that the commander is (morally) responsible for what his soldiers do when following his orders.
Rather, this is because, for the typical commander, any criticism he might direct towards his soldiers for faithfully following his commands would have to be -in a sense to be explained -"hypocritical". Consider the case of Steffen:
Steffen is a typical Nazi commander working in a death camp. He hears rumors of an escape attempt. Thus, he orders Thomas to investigate the fence and sound the alarm, should he see any prisoners escaping. Thomas sees the prisoners, sounds the alarm, and the prisoners are caught and executed. Now, Thomas should have let the prisoners go; he should have had mercy and simply reported back to Steffen that there was nothing to the rumors. But he doesn't.
In this case, of course, Steffen lacks the standing to blame Thomas for sounding the alarm.
Indeed, absent further details, the case can seem unintelligible: why would Steffen -a typical Nazi commander, and someone who presumably endorses actions such as Thomas' -be
blaming Thomas for what he does?
Consider Jonas, however:
Jonas is a Nazi commander working in a death camp. However, unlike Steffen, Instead, however, Thomas discovers the escaping prisoners, sounds the alarm, and the prisoners are caught and executed.
It seems clear that, in this case, Jonas retains the standing to blame Thomas for sounding the alarm. Hearing the alarm, it seems perfectly appropriate for Jonas to inwardly condemn Of course, some will want to say that there is a crucial difference here: whereas Nigel was justified in (or had an excuse for) not preventing the terrorist's wrong action (at least according to non-consequentialists), God -some will say -has no excuse for failing to prevent our wrong actions. In particular, if God exists as imagined by open theists, then
clearly God currently has something like a policy of not preventing all of the wrong actions we may perform. (I do not say that God clearly has a policy of not preventing any such actions; perhaps God is indeed, unbeknownst to us, preventing a great deal of wrongdoing that would otherwise occur, but for his actions.) However, certain proponents of the 14 problem of evil may claim that God is not justified in adopting this sort of policy: God should adopt the policy of never allowing anyone ever to perform morally wrong actions.
But now the point is clear. Here we are simply considering the problem of evil -or some aspect of the problem of evil. The proponent of this problem may grant that the mere fact that God hasn't prevented the wrongdoing does not imply that God does not condemn this wrongdoing; she may admit that God does condemn it, and appropriately so -and even that therefore God has "standing". Nevertheless, she maintains that God's decision in this regard is in fact morally wrong. Thus, she contends that, in point of fact, the person we have been calling "God" cannot be God -cannot be, inter alia, morally perfect, whether or not this person has standing.
Whether God could be justified in adopting the policy of not always preventing wrongdoing is a question I will not pursue. I simply note that this is a different question than the question whether God has standing. And, from the considerations adduced so far, we have no reason, I believe, to say that God lacks the standing to blame, given open theism.
At most, what we could claim is that God has mistaken priorities: there is wrongdoing that The problem of divine "schizophrenia", then, can be dissolved. It isn't as if, at first, when God is constructing the story of the world, God has a preference for (or otherwise enjoys the thought of) lies, and so includes some lies in the relevant "script" for that reason.
No. All along, God does not like (that is, condemns) lies. But what God also likes -and is
justified in liking -is an overall excellent script, and God realizes that the best overall script will be one that includes some lies; so God includes them. When those lies in fact come to pass, precisely as God determined, no sudden attitude change is required in order for God to condemn them: God needn't go from having preferred or endorsed lying to now condemning lying. God never endorsed lying to begin with, and God has condemned lying all along.
Importantly: from the mere fact that God has included some lies in the relevant script, it does not follow that God approves of (or otherwise endorses) lying. So it seems that what Hasker says could not possibly be could easily be.
Hasker, however, is not alone in suspecting that there would have to be a deep attitudinal tension in God, according to traditional theological determinism. xiii Albert
Einstein, for instance, once wrote as follows:
Nobody, certainly, will deny that the idea of the existence of an omnipotent, just, and omnibenevolent personal God is able to accord man solace, help, and guidance… But, on the other hand, there are decisive weaknesses attached to this idea in itself, which have been painfully felt since the beginning … if this being is omnipotent then every occurrence, including every human thought, and every human feeling and aspiration, is also his work. How is it possible to think of holding men responsible for their deeds and thoughts before such an almighty Being? In giving out punishments and rewards he would be … passing judgment on himself. (Einstein 1950: 26 -27) Now, Einstein was, of course, Einstein -but here he can be seen to be making a mistake. To explain. Suppose that theological determinism is true, and God criticizes Jones for lying. Is God therefore judging himself for lying? Of course not; God didn't lie. Of course, God did bring it about that Jones will lie, but to bring it about that someone will lie is not thereby to lie (let alone oneself to perform numerically the same action as the action brought about). xiv Perhaps, then, the idea is that, if God passes judgment on Jones for lying, God would have to pass judgment on himself for bringing it about that Jones lies. But here we must be careful. For whereas God will accept responsibility for bringing it about that Jones lies (given theological determinism, this much cannot be denied), God will not -naturallycriticize himself for bringing this about. Indeed, if anything, God will congratulate himself, since God recognizes that Jones's lying (at the relevant time and in the relevant way) is an essential part of the overall excellent script the realization of which God is executing. Now, some may wish to say that this contention is implausible -that it is implausible that a lie would be, in this way, a necessary part of the best (or one of the best…) of all possible worlds (or perhaps that, even if it were, God would be permitted to bring it about).
But here, once more, we simply encounter a different problem: the problem of evil. The important point, at this stage, is the following: there is no reason, given theological determinism, that in criticizing Jones for lying, in order to maintain psychological consistency, God would also have to be (implausibly) criticizing himself. For whereas creatures do something wrong when they act wrongly, God will maintain that he does not do wrong when he acts so as to bring about those wrongs, given their role in the overall fabric of reality. At the very least, it is this thesis that Einstein ought to target, if he wants to object to traditional theism. But to target this thesis is to take up the problem of evil; it is to challenge the thesis that God could be morally perfect, given that God sometimes determines wrongdoing. The seeming problem of attitudinal consistency -that God would be "judging himself" -has disappeared.
But perhaps we should slow down. For I seem to be saying that there can be no moral objection to God's both determining creatures to perform various wrong actions and blaming them for performing those actions, whereas I expect that many readers will suppose that there is indeed -there must be! -available such an objection. But my point here is not that there can be no such moral objection. My point, instead, is that given compatibilism there can be no such objection.
Paul Russell, himself a naturalist and a compatibilist, however, disagrees. Russell's position is as follows. As concerns our own responsibility, there is no morally important difference between the deterministic causes of our actions just being there and their instead being there as a result of someone's agency. Naturalist compatibilists, he thinks, therefore must admit that human moral responsibility is -in principle -compatible with the truth of a doctrine like theological determinism. xv Now, if you think that this result, in itself, is a bad result for compatibilists, then you agree with contemporary incompatibilists who have developed so-called "manipulation arguments" for incompatibilism. xvi Russell, however, wishes to take at least some of the sting out of this result, by claiming that whereas we may appropriately blame each other on such a view, God, at any rate, cannot. As I hope will become clear, however, I do not see that Russell has made a good case for this conclusion.
Russell begins as follows:
We might say that since B controls A's agency there is insufficient causal distance between them to sustain the reactive stance. Moral communication and responsiveness presupposes that agents are not related to each other as controller and controlee. When a controller takes up an evaluative/reactive stance toward an agent he controls there is plainly an element of fraud or self-deception going on.
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The controller can only praise or blame himself for the way in which the agent succeeds or fails to be guided by available reasons. (2010: 159) There are least two separate points here. One point is a point to which we have already responded; it is the claim, assessed above, that there is an attitudinal "switch" implied by
God's blame which would have to be incoherent or otherwise "fraudulent". The second point, however, is a claim about "causal distance". On this score, when I read Russell's claim, I think: "Spoken like a true incompatibilist" -except that Russell is not an incompatibilist. On Russell's view, even though there is "insufficient causal distance"
between the controller and the controllee for the controller appropriately to blame, nevertheless the controller gives the controlled free will. It is this that I find puzzling -and implausible. Whereas I can certainly understand the claim that there is indeed insufficient causal distance between the relevant parties for blame to be appropriate, this is because I can understand the claim that this lack of distance implies (or is constitutive of) the controlled agent's lack of freedom. But I cannot understand the claim that there is this "lack of distance", when the "controlled" party is indeed free.
It is worth bringing out here the fundamental weakness of Russell's compatibilism.
If, on your view, God might create a community of agents and give them free will (and make them fully autonomous and responsible), and yet there is "insufficient causal distance" between those creatures and God to license (the in-principle possibility of) God's holding them responsible, then the problem here is not with God; it is with your conception of free will and moral responsibility. It is far more natural to suppose that there would be such distance in virtue of God's making such creatures genuinely free and responsible. On Russell's view, though God has indeed given the relevant agents free will, there is still a lack of the requisite "causal distance", and so God can only blame himself for how they use it. This is absurd.
In this light, consider the ways in which the incompatibilist will simply agree with
Russell. Russell writes:
We may say that when the relationship between two individuals is one involving covert control then the participant stance on the side of the controller is compromised.
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The controller is not entitled to take a participant stance in circumstances where he decides when reasons, criticisms, and so on succeed or fail to move the agent. (160) So far, the incompatibilist agrees: when the controller decides when reasons do or do not move the agent, certainly the agent cannot also be responsible for when she is or is not moved by such reasons, and in that case the controller certainly will not be "entitled" to condemn her for how she is or is not so-moved. But this is not, of course, the interpretation of these facts favored by Russell. Commenting now on the case at hand, Russell writes:
There is something "absurd" about the suggestion that God holds human beings accountable (in a future state) for events that he ordains. (161) Once again, the incompatibilist agrees. There is indeed something absurd about the suggestion that God holds human beings to account for events that he ordains, and that is precisely the suggestion that those human beings could be responsible for events God ordains. blame" would imply that God is not so-entitled? So far, all we have is the suggestion that there is something "fraudulent" about God's stance -but we have seen how such an objection may be answered. We are simply left with the mere suggestion that there is something "absurd" about God's holding human beings responsible for events God ordains.
But whereas there is at hand a ready explanation of this absurdity, this explanation is that of the incompatibilist.
Here, then, we reach the following conclusion: compatibilists ought simply to embrace the result that God might have the moral standing to blame those God determines. This is, I suggest, the best, and the most principled, compatibilist option available. Such a conclusion, of course, has long since been endorsed by various central philosophical figures in western theism -and is sometimes similarly embraced in recent times. Donald M.
Mackay, for instance, once wrote:
Insofar as the parallel holds between human and Divine authorship, the foregoing
[compatibilist] analysis may help to draw the fatalistic sting commonly felt in the theological doctrine of predestination; but we may still feel that if God is our sovereign Author, we cannot be held really responsible -at least not by Him. (1967: 33) Mackay, however, ultimately rejects this (he thinks pessimistic) conclusion, writing that Logically, we can depend for our existence upon the 'creative' will of God-ineternity, and still be answerable for our response as free beings to the 'normative' will of God-in-dialogue.
There are, to be sure, and as Mackay recognizes, still mysteries associated with this doctrine, not all of which I have discussed in this essay. But this doctrine is, I suggest, the most attractive position for any compatibilist to take -whether theist or not. Compatibilists should, I submit, be compatibilists all the way through. If, however, this doctrine is, for you, one step too far, then the result is this: for you, compatibilism is one step too far.
Conclusion
It is worth recapping where we've been in this paper. One of the most difficult and contentious questions in the history of western theism has always been whether divine providence is consistent with creaturely responsibility. Traditional theists, however, do not merely wish to say that we are responsible, but further wish to say that God holds us responsible. But here we encounter deep and difficult questions regarding standingquestions that are just beginning to get the attention they deserve. As I hope this essay has made clear, however, the question of God's standing has not yet received this sort of detailed attention. As I see it, the problem of God's standing deserves explicit recognition as a central problem in the philosophy religion. The problem is not how God could be responsible for wrongdoing. The problem is not how God could be perfect, given the facts of evil. The problem is how it could be appropriate for God to blame us, given how intimately involved
God is in what we do. Perhaps, the theological determinists may say, ignoring this problem is yet one more mistake which God has determined us to make, but is nevertheless disappointed in us for making. Whatever the case: we should make it no more.
crimes. Precisely how tight the analogy is to God's holding us responsible (given a certain model of providence) is a question I will not pursue.
iv Matt King, in a recent paper (2014), explicitly defends this conception of moral standing and the "involvement" condition. Lippert-Rasmussen (2013: 299) seems open to the possibility as well. For an interesting discussion of the concept of "moral residue" (albeit in a different context than the one at issue here), see Stump 2004. v Of course, this claim might be challenged; in fact, this claim was seemingly challenged by Jesus in the famous episode of the woman caught in adultery. Here Jesus says: "He who is without sin may cast the first stone", not "He who has not committed adultery may cast the first stone." If the idea here is that only the sinless are in position to condemn, then the implication is that none of us are in position to condemn. Readers may make of this suggestion what they will.
vi Again, I more fully develop these points in (withheld2), and some of the material in this section is borrowed from (withheld 1 and withheld2). x E.g., Ross 1969 : 257 -269. White (2016 also endorses the analogy, so long as we keep in mind, as surely we must, that "God does not create representations of agents but the real thing." 27 xi Derk Pereboom (2016) , however, defends an incompatibilist version of theological determinism, on which we simply aren't morally responsible (in what he calls the "basic desert" sense).
xii Something in the neighbourhood of this problem is often hinted at, but not fully addressed. For instance, Frederick Vivian writes: "The Calvinists and the Jansenists fully realised the contradiction and were prepared to sacrifice free will, undismayed by the absurdity of making God both Creator and Judge." (1964: 76) For further reflections "in the neighbourhood", see Sommers' (2012: 73 -83) discussion of the Calvinist views of Jonathan Edwards, and Le Poidevin 1995.
xiii Cf. Jerry Walls 2016: 89: "The notion that God is angry at sins he himself determines, when he could have determined things otherwise, and then pours out his wrath on those same actions is puzzling in the extreme, to say the least." Walls here seems to be intimating that there is puzzle concerning how the relevant set of divine attitudes is coherent or consistent. It is this complaint that I believe has an adequate answer. Note: even though Walls is an incompatibilist, the implication of this passage does not seem to be simply that it is puzzling how God might regard it as fair to blame or punish people for performing actions he determined them to perform. What is puzzling, according to this suggestion, is something like the (alleged) attitudinal change that would have to be 
